The adoption of IAS/IFRS has two opposite effects on audit fees: on the one hand, greater effort is required from auditors, which is likely to be reflected by higher fees; on the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality of financial reporting, expected liability costs could decrease and lower fees may be demanded. We consider a large sample of Italian banks and we examine the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on audit fees. The results show that higher fees (19.29% in real terms) are paid after the switch to the new standards. Using a standard earnings management model, we do not find support for the idea that financial reporting quality is affected by the adoption of IAS/IFRS. The observed increase in fees is positively associated with the presence of financial derivatives held for hedging purposes. This paper extends the findings of prior research on the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on audit fees; contrary to prior contributions, our analysis concentrates on the banking industry.
INTRODUCTION
Auditing activity is a critical aspect of the switch to new accounting standards, and audit fees represent a part of the related implementation costs. In this paper we investigate how the introduction of the international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS) influences auditors' fee determination in the Italian banking industry. We argue that IAS/IFRS adoption has two opposite effects on fees. On the one hand, the use of IAS/IFRS -which are principle-based and fair value oriented standards, as opposed to previous Italian regulation -implies greater effort for auditors; this is likely to be reflected by higher fees. On the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality of financial reporting, the expected liability costs for auditors decrease, which may, therefore, lead to lower fees. survey conducted among investors, preparers, and auditors across 23 EU countries shows that "the costs of auditing IFRS implementation were significant, ranking as the second highest cost for companies with turnover below €500m and the third highest for larger companies" (ICAEW, 2007: p.61). According to the same source, 67% of the auditors said that "their audit fee for the first set of IFRS financial statements was higher as a direct consequence of IFRS" (ICAEW, 2007: p.72 ). It has also been argued that the demand for auditing work is expected to increase with the adoption of IFRS in the US (Accountancy Age, 2008) .
Only a few academic works are concerned with the change in audit fees after IAS/IFRS adoption. Griffin et al. (2009) find an audit fee increase associated with the adoption of IAS/IFRS and the concurrent introduction of new corporate governance rules in New Zealand. Vieru and Schadewitz (2010) investigate fee determination in the transition year to the IAS/IFRS for small and medium-sized Finnish companies. Kim et al. (2012) develop an analytical audit model to examine the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on fees through audit complexity and financial reporting quality; they test the predictions of the model using data from 14 European countries and excluding the financial industry. The aforementioned studies generally find an increase in fees after IAS/IFRS adoption. The sample of all the analyses is limited to listed firms.
We extend the findings of prior research on IAS/IFRS adoption and audit fees as we concentrate on the banking industry. Furthermore, unlike previous works, we consider both listed and non-listed firms.
The relationship between auditors and banks is a critical regulatory issue. The recent credit derivatives market turmoil highlighted the importance of internal and external control mechanisms in the banking industry. As argued by previous empirical studies on the divergence of opinions among market participants and analysts (Morgan, 2002 , Flannery et al., 2004 , banks' financial statements are more opaque than those of non-financial firms. The bottom line is that intermediation risk and, specifically, loans and financial assets are hard to monitor from the outside; as a consequence, in such an opaque environment, auditing activity plays a particularly important role in mitigating information asymmetries.
Our analysis focuses on the Italian banking industry. One benefit of using data from a single industry is that our analysis does not suffer from the industry effect problem (Carson, 2009; Francis, 2011; Reichelt and Wang, 2010) . i We argue that Italy is a suitable setting for our study for at least three reasons. Firstly, according to Italian regulation (see section 2), all Italian banks are obliged to use IAS/IFRS in their annual accounts. This allows us to examine the impact of adopting IAS/IFRS in a dataset which also includes non-listed firms. A further interesting specificity of the Italian setting is that audit firms cannot deliver general non-audit services. They may only provide services limited to the accounting organisation of the firms, as well as auditing services. Italian data show that auditing activities account for about 90% of total revenues of Big Audit Firms (Cameran, 2007) . Thus, in general, the extent of audit fees paid is not significantly influenced by the possibility of obtaining or maintaining the engagement for other services. Finally, the Italian environment is a typical example of a stakeholder-oriented accounting system (like France, Germany, Belgium, and Spain). As emphasised by previous works (Bartov et al., 2005; Hung and Subramanyam, 2007) , IAS/IFRS are influenced by a shareholder-oriented model; consequently, we consider a market where the effect of the transition to the new standards is likely to be particularly marked.
ii Notice that the level of accounting disclosure requirements before IAS/IFRS adoption in the EU is generally similar to the Italian one (Wingate, 1997) . Moreover, the risk -due to the level of litigiousness -of doing business as an auditor in Italy is similar to the other, more often studied, European countries (Wingate, 1997).
iii
We consider a large sample of Italian banks from 1999 to 2006, basing our analysis on a panel model relating fees to firm-specific determinants. We obtain audit fee data through questionnaires because Italian non-listed firms are not required to disclose audit fees in their financial statements. Using specific indicators for the banking industry, we relate fees paid to the size and the risk of the auditee. We find that higher fees are paid after IAS/IFRS are first adopted, consistent with the view that the adoption of IAS/IFRS does, indeed, make the auditor's task more complex. Investigated in the context of a standard earnings management model, our findings do not support the conjecture that IAS/IFRS improve banks' financial reporting quality. We further analyse the determinants of increased audit effort and find that the increase in fees after the adoption of the new standards is associated with the presence of financial derivatives held for hedging purposes.
The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 concentrates on the IAS/IFRS implementation in Italy, section 3 deals with the hypothesis development, sections 4 and 5 describe the model and the dataset used; section 6 presents the empirical analysis; section 7 concludes.
IAS/IFRS IMPLEMENTATION IN ITALY
With a view to harmonising financial information presented by the companies, the European 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT: IAS/IFRS TRANSITION PROCESS AND AUDIT FEES
Consistent with previous literature, we interpret fee variation in the framework of Simunic's (1980) model, where audit fees are determined by the cost of audit effort and an expected liability loss component. The former depends on the auditor's workload or on hourly prices, the latter on the auditor's legal liability costs. We argue that the adoption of IAS/IFRS has two opposite effects on audit fees, as explained below.
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WHY COULD FEES INCREASE WITH IAS/IFRS?
The adoption of IAS/IFRS increases auditor effort. Greater effort is required from auditors because IAS/IFRS are principle-based, fair value oriented standards -as opposed to Italian GAAP, which are rule-based and historical cost oriented -and, hence, require auditors to make more complex estimates and to use greater professional judgment (Kim et al., 2012 , KPMG 2007 , Deloitte 2008 ). The effect is likely to be stronger in the transition year as auditors have to acquire competences and skills not required with Italian GAAP. Both practitioners (Hoogendoorn, 2006) and academics (Haller, 2002; Whittington, 2005) have stressed the difficulties encountered and the preparation required for the transition to the new accounting standards. Therefore, we would expect to observe higher audit fees after the adoption of IAS/IFRS.
Fair value accounting and audit fees -Some recent studies examine the relation between fair value accounting and audit fees. Ettredge et al. (2011) document that auditors charge higher fees as the proportion of assets at fair value increases for a sample of US bank holding companies; moreover their findings show that less verifiable fair values increase audit fees. Hu et al. (2012) , in the Australian setting, document that auditees choosing the revaluation model experience higher audit fees than those choosing the cost model; they interpret the results as evidence that audit pricing varies with the reliability of asset revaluation. Differently, Goncharov et al. (2012) concentrate on the European real estate industry around mandatory IFRS adoption; they find that audit fees are significantly lower for auditees reporting property assets at fair value relative to those reporting property assets at depreciated cost. This difference is (partially) driven by impairment tests that occur only when companies use depreciated costs. They again provide evidence that the difficulty to measure fair value matters in audit fee determination.
Evidence of increase in fees after IAS/IFRS adoption: Academic research -Limited
academic research exists on how audit fees are influenced by IAS/IFRS as against previous accounting standards. Griffin et al. (2009) This implies greater overhead costs for audit firms.
WHY COULD FEES DECREASE WITH IAS/IFRS?
Higher quality financial statements reduce auditors' risk of mis-statement or misinterpretation. As documented by prior literature (Palmrose, 1988; Lys and Watts, 1994; Heninger, 2001 ) stakeholders perceiving a failure in financial reporting are more likely to sue the auditor. Consequently, higher quality financial statements reduce expected liability costs and may lead to lower fees required by auditors. This argument is formalized, for example, in the model of Kim et al., (2012) . Hence, if IAS/IFRS imply higher quality financial reporting, we would expect to observe a decrease in fees.
Audit fees and financial reporting quality -A number of studies are concerned with the association between audit fees and the quality of financial reporting. One part of this literature employs fees as dependent variable and financial reporting quality as explanatory variable; the results of these works tend to support the view that financial reporting quality is negatively associated with audit fees. Gul et al. (2003) find that higher audit fees are paid by firms with a higher absolute value of discretionary accruals; they argue that auditors require greater audit fees as they perceive a higher risk of mis-estimation and valuation errors. Bedard and Johnstone (2004) show that, when auditors perceive that a client has increased risk of earnings management, audit planning is adjusted; examining planned audit fees, they conclude that "audit partners plan on charging higher billing rates when the perception of earnings management risk is high". Feldman et al. (2009) find that restatement firms have higher audit fees in the following periods; they interpret their findings as evidence that higher audit fees reflect greater earnings management risk. Schelleman and Knechel (2010) find support for the view that that auditors charge a fee premium for clients with greater risk of earnings management; they also find that auditors increase effort in response to increase earnings management risk.
Another side of the literature has also used financial reporting quality as dependent variable and fees as explanatory variable; the results of these studies are mixed. Some works (Frankel et al., 2002 , Hoitash et al., 2007 Chi et al., 2011 Blankley et al., 2012) find a negative association between financial reporting quality and fees paid to auditors. Other studies (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 2003 , Chung and Kallapur, 2003 , Larcker and Richardson, 2004 , Whisenant et al., 2003 find that the quality of financial reporting is not significantly associated with audit fees. firms which waited until IAS/IFRS became mandatory exhibit only a modest increase in earnings management. Pope and McLealy (2011: p.233) argue that "results on the consequences of IFRS adoption and the quality of implementation are far from uniform across Europe, and depend on factors reflecting preparer incentives and the effectiveness of local enforcement".
IAS/IFRS adoption and financial reporting quality -
We argue that the overall effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on fees is an empirical issue and we formulate the following null hypothesis (which does not take a directional form):
Hypothesis 1 -Audit fees do not increase after the adoption of IAS/IFRS.
MODEL
Only few audit fee determination studies concentrate on financial institutions (e.g., Fields et al., 2004 and Kangaretnam et al., 2010a) . Our empirical model is based on the analysis by Fields et al. (2004) . Specifically, we relate fees paid to the size and the risk of the auditee, considering four types of risk: liquidity risk, operating risk, credit risk, and capital risk.
SIZE -In general, the findings of previous audit fee studies indicate that auditee size is the most important explanatory variable in the determination of fees. In larger companies additional detailed audit procedures and tests have to be implemented; thus, auditors have to spend more time on and put more effort into testing and analysing data and information (Simunic, 1980; Hay et al., 2006) . It can be assumed that the same argument applies to banks, and we expect to observe a positive association between size and audit fees. We measure size as the natural logarithm of total assets.
LIQUIDITY RISK -We use transaction accounts and investment securities as proxies for bank liquidity risk. The former can also be considered as a measure of complexity, because banks with higher proportion of transaction accounts have more complex activities to monitor. The relation between transaction accounts and audit fees is, therefore, expected to be positive. We argue that investment securities may be negatively or positively related to audit fees. Liquidity risk decreases as the proportion of total assets held as securities increases; thus, from a liquidity risk point of view, the relation between investment securities and audit fees is expected to be negative.
However, a higher proportion of securities implies a higher business risk, due to the volatility of financial markets and this can be reflected by higher fees.
OPERATING RISK -We measure operating risk by the efficiency ratio i.e. total operating expense on total revenues. A higher ratio implies less efficiency within the bank (and higher operating risk) and, consequently, greater complexity for the audit function. Thus, we expect to observe a positive relation between the efficiency ratio and audit fees.
CREDIT RISK -We measure credit risk by the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans.
We expect to find a positive relationship between audit fees and our indicator of credit risk, since verifying the adequacy of the loan loss reserve account is one of the auditor's major responsibilities.
CAPITAL RISK -Capital risk is measured firstly by using the total risk-adjusted capital ratio and intangible assets. Both measures are expected to be positively related to capital risk and, thus, to audit fees. We also consider two country-specific measures of capital risk: (i) the ratio of the fund for general banking risks to the sum of total liabilities and shareholders' equity; (ii) the ratio of guarantees given and commitments registered off balance sheet to the sum of total liabilities and shareholders' equity. The fund for general banking risk is prescribed by EU Directive 86/635: "in view of the particular risks associated with banking and of the need to maintain confidence, provision should be made for the possibility of introducing a liabilities item in the balance sheet entitled 'Fund for general banking risks'". The same EU directive requires that " the notes to the accounts shall state the nature and amount of any type of commitment which is material in relation to an institution's activities." As a reference for the second country-specific capital risk measure we consider guarantees given and commitments indicated in the notes according to the EU directive.
Capital risk increases with measures (i) and (ii) and we then expect them to be positively associated with fees.
FURTHER DETERMINANTS OF FEES -We control for loss firms by including a dummy
variable for negative net income. Following, for example, Kanagaretnam (2010a) , we also include a dummy variable for parent companies. We then consider the square root of the number of bank branches, which is a typical indicator of complexity (Hay et al., 2006) . As opposed to other studies in the banking industry, we consider non-listed banks in our analysis; as the listing status has been documented to be relevant in audit fee models also in Italy (see, e.g, Cameran, 2005) , we include a dummy variable for listed firms. Furthermore, in line with previous literature documenting a fee premium for large audit firms, we include a dummy variable for the "BIG N" auditors. Finally, we include a dummy variable for observations after 2002, on the grounds that 2002 was the year of Arthur Andersen's (AA) demise. vii The rationale for this variable is to control for the change in the Italian audit market structure following the AA collapse, which has reduced the number of Big audit firms from five to four. As the market share of Big N in Italy has been traditionally higher than in Anglo-Saxon countries, the US General Accounting Office's concern over the competitiveness of the audit market after AA's dissolution (GAO, 2003) is, in our setting, more serious.
The basic model used in the empirical analysis is the following: Audit fee data are obtained through questionnaires (i.e. direct inquiry to the banks using fax or e-mail).
x We use questionnaires because Italian non-listed firms are not required to disclose audit fees paid in their financial statements. Listed companies (and so listed banks) have been required to disclose their audit fees only starting from 2007. A further benefit of using questionnaire-based data is that we are able to exclude some fee components which are unrelated to our research question.
Specifically, in the transition year to IAS/IFRS, auditors charged an additional amount to prepare the reconciliation prospects concerning the previous year; the fees that we asked for exclude this amount. Furthermore, we excluded expense reimbursements. variables included in the same regression is greater than 50%, with the exception of the correlation between fees and total assets (Pearson correlation coefficient equal to 80.6%).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The effect of adopting IAS/IFRS As in the standard approach, audit fees are related to the size and the risk of the auditee.
Most previous works examine cross-sectional data; the few works concerned with the trend in fees over different years generally estimate pooling regressions (Menon and Williams; 2001; McMeeking et al., 2007) . Our dataset consists of 136 banks over 8 years, and we estimate a panel model with firm-specific fixed effects. To test hypothesis 1 we include a dummy variable for financial statements under IAS/IFRS (IAS) in the basic model described in section 4 (specification
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results are reported in Table 3 (column 1). As expected, the coefficient of ASSETS is positive, indicating that fees are positively related to a size proxy. Moreover, fees are positively related to the number of branches and to the dummy for listed firms, which can be interpreted as complexity proxies for banks.
As expected, the relation between fees and three indicators of capital risk (INTANG, The coefficient of BIG, although positive, is not significantly different from zero. It should be noticed, however, that, in the sample considered, 91% of audit firms belong to the "Big N"
group. Not surprisingly, the variance in fees is mostly explained by the other regressors, and there is no evidence of a premium for big audit firms.
LISTED displays a positive coefficient, as expected. However, it is only weakly (10% level) significantly different from zero. A possible explanation could be that the association between the listed status of a firm and fees paid is partially captured by size. We also orthogonalized size to LISTED (we replaced ASSETS by the residuals in the regression of ASSETS on LISTED -the results are untabulated) and the coefficient of LISTED is positive and highly significant (ttest=3.64).
xii Surprisingly, the coefficient of NONPERF is negative and not significantly different from zero. This does not support the common interpretation, according to which credit risk increases with non-performing loans and greater fees should be required (Fields et al. 2004) . We investigate more on this point in the robustness checks.
After controlling for the auditor and auditee characteristics, the results suggest that accounting standards influence fee determination. Firstly, we consider the likelihood that managers manage earnings for benchmark-beating behaviour; secondly, we examine the pattern of income increasing loan loss provisions.
1) Earnings benchmark model
We estimate the following logit model, relating an earnings benchmark indicator to the dummy for IAS/IFRS financial statements and to a set of control variables. where the definition of the variables can be found in Table 1 .
2) Income increasing abnormal loan loss provisions model
The approach involves two stages. We first measure abnormal loan loss provision as the residual from a model relating the loan loss provision to a set of control variables. We then focus on the absolute value of negative abnormal loan loss provisions (which are income increasing) and relate it to the dummy for IAS/IFRS financial statements. We interpret a positive (negative) where the definition of the variables can be found in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 4] The results of the earnings benchmark model are reported in Panel A of Table 4 . In both specifications the coefficient of IAS is negative but not significant. The results of the incomeincreasing loan provision model (second-stage equation) are presented in Panel B of Table 4 (column 1); the coefficient of IAS is again negative and highly insignificant. xv Both models indicate that the extent of earnings management is not associated with IAS/IFRS financial statements.
In light of previous literature, the results are not surprising. As mentioned, the international evidence on the effect of the adoption of IAS/IFRS on audit fees is mixed. These findings suggest that the effect of IAS/IFRS on financial reporting quality cannot explain the change in fees with the new standards. The results described are consistent with the conjecture that the adoption of IAS/IFRS increases the effort required from auditors, thus leading to greater fees.
Fair value accounting and financial derivatives
In the elements of banks' financial statements, financial derivatives are among the items most affected by the IAS/IFRS adoption. The change in accounting for derivatives might have had an important role in explaining the results. We test whether the observed increase in fees after the adoption of the new standards is associated with the presence of financial derivatives.
Firstly, IAS/IFRS require a wider application of fair value for financial instruments and, thus, for financial derivatives. Before the adoption of IAS/IFRS, financial instruments were classified into two categories in Italy: current assets and long-term investments. In general, financial instruments belonging to current assets were evaluated at the minimum between market value and cost, whereas instruments in long-term investments could be evaluated at their cost. With IAS/IFRS, financial assets and financial liabilities have a more articulated classification. For the initial measurement (i.e. the first time the instruments are written in the financial statements), fair value accounting is extended to all financial instruments. In subsequent measurements, fair value accounting is prescribed for most financial instruments; cost accounting is limited to loans and receivables and to investments held to maturity. Auditing derivatives evaluated at fair value, especially when traded in illiquid markets or in secondary markets, arguably implies an increased auditor effort.
Moreover, IAS/IFRS modify the classification of derivatives in the financial statements.
xvi With Italian GAAP, derivatives were classified as capital commitments and, thus, were treated as off-balance sheet items. Conversely, with IAS/IFRS, derivatives are considered as financial instruments and they are classified accordingly. Italian GAAP do not prescribe detailed rules for the evaluation of items in the capital commitments (Italian GAAP require that capital commitments should complement the balance sheet to give a true view of the financial position). Consequently, auditing items in the financial statements requires more effort than items in capital commitments.
Importantly, IAS 39 introduces a major change in the evaluation of securities held for hedging purposes. Before the adoption of IAS/IFRS in Italy, hedging derivatives were evaluated using the same measurement rule used for the hedged items to which they were related -the "consistency evaluation rule". Contrary to this, IAS 39 overturns the consistency evaluation rule and prescribes to evaluate both hedging derivatives and the hedged items at their fair value in the three forms of hedging considered; xvii this implies a wider application of fair value (both for the derivatives and the hedged items) and, accordingly, greater effort required in the evaluation/auditing of the derivatives and the related hedge items.
As for the definition of hedging, IAS 39, Paragraph 8, sets precise rules; xviii whereas Italian GAAP did not provide any definition of hedging. IAS/IFRS constrain managers' discretion in the classification of financial derivatives; this requires greater effort from auditors to ensure compliance with the new rules. Additionally, with IAS/IFRS, the effectiveness of the hedge must be verified on an ongoing basis, something which further increases the work burden for auditors.
To sum up, derivatives under IAS/IFRS requires auditors greater effort than under Italian
GAAP: in terms of wider application of fair value, compliance with new classification rules, and ongoing verification of the efficacy of the hedge. In banks' financial reporting, derivatives, held both for trading and for hedging purposes, play a crucial role. Thus we expect derivatives to contribute to the conjectured increase in auditors' fees after the adoption of IAS/IFRS.
We consider, therefore, how a measure of the amount of derivatives is related to fees around the introduction of IAS/IFRS. We measure the total amount of derivatives (total derivatives, TD)
by:
Active Derivatives Passive Derivatives TD Total Assets Total Liabilities  , where active derivatives and passive derivatives are defined as the derivative instruments classified in assets and in liabilities, respectively. We then introduce in specification [1] the dummy for IAS financial statements and an interaction term involving the measure of the amount of derivatives and the dummy for IAS financial statements.
The results, which are reported in Table 5 (column 1), show that the coefficient of (IAS)*(TD) does not significantly differ from zero. Table 5 , are consistent with the ones obtained when looking at the overall effect of financial derivatives on fee change after IAS/IFRS adoption. Both in the transition year and in the following year, the fee increase is positively associated with the presence of hedging derivatives, whereas it is not significantly affected by the amount of trading derivatives.
Robustness checks
To assess the robustness of the results, we run a number of additional tests. The results are untabulated for space constraints.
Firstly, we modify the specification of the model (which is presented in Table 3 We inquire into whether the effect of the new standards on fees is different for public and non-public firms by including an interaction term between IAS and LISTED in the main model. The coefficient of the interaction term is not significantly different from zero; this suggests that the increase in fees cannot be explained by the listing status of the firms.
Moreover, we consider two additional control variables that have been found by prior literature to be related to audit fee determination. Previous studies document that US large local offices charge higher audit fees compared to small local offices as a consequence of better audit quality provided (Choi et al., 2010) . Evidence of different pricing among different offices is also documented in Europe (e.g. Zerni, 2012). Accordingly, we include in the main model a variable measuring office size (OFFSIZE). Because the largest audit firm offices are located in Rome (the political capital) and in Milan (the economic capital, where the stock market is located), OFFSIZE is defined as a dummy variable coded one if the audit firm is based in Milan or in Rome. We also relate audit fees to mortgage loans as a proportion of gross loans (MORTGLOANS); the variable is calculated similar to Fields et al. (2004) . We obtain the amount of mortgage loans from Bankscope and we integrate missing values with data from the financial statements (hand collection).The coefficients of OFFSIZE and MORTGLOANS are not significantly different from zero. Inference on the IAS coefficient is unchanged.
The coefficient of NONPERF in the main model is not significantly different from zero.
Confounding effects of NONPERF on fees may be due to managers' incentives to reduce the amount of non-performing loans reported; the incentives might be different across listed and nonlisted firms and may be mediated by the quality of auditors. Accordingly, we segment the results by an earnings management subsample (we consider the earnings management indicator, measured by LA and JMBE), by LISTED and by BIG. The findings show that in none of the subsamples considered is the coefficient of NONPERF significantly different from zero.
Three potentially relevant accounting and governance reforms were passed during our time sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) As a further possible determinant of an increase in audit effort, we consider the role of the general disparity between Italian GAAP xx and IAS/IFRS. We test whether a disparity indicator is associated with the increase in fees after the adoption of the new standards. We use a measure of disparity of accounting standards in the spirit of Adams et al. (1999) and Vieru and Schadewitz Finally, we estimate the main model for two allowed legal forms for Italian banks (limited liability vs cooperative/mutual banks), separately, in order to further control for the effect of the proprietorship structure; xxii the results are unchanged in both sub-samples.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we investigate how the introduction of the international accounting/financial reporting standards (IAS/IFRS) affects auditors' fee determination in the banking industry. We argue that the adoption of the new standards has two opposite effects on audit fees: on the one hand, the use of IAS/FRS -which are principle-based and fair value oriented standards, as opposed to
Italian GAAP -implies greater effort for auditors; this is likely to be reflected by higher fees; on the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality of financial reporting, expected liability costs decrease and lower fees may be demanded. This study extends the findings of prior research on the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption on audit fees; contrary to prior contributions, our analysis concentrates on the financial industry and includes both listed and non-listed companies.
We focus on a sample of Italian banks from 1999 to 2006. The Italian environment offers the possibility of investigating the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption also for non-publicly traded firms, while the limits for Italian auditor services guarantee that there are no confusing effects due to nonaudit fees. We estimate a panel model relating fees to firm-specific determinants. The results indicate that higher fees are paid after the adoption of IAS/IFRS, in line with the findings reported by practitioner journals. We document a real fee increase after IAS/IFRS adoption approximately equal to 19.29%. This effect is consistent with the view that IAS/IFRS adoption implies higher auditor effort. Our fee data do not support the idea that IAS/IFRS improve banks' financial reporting quality. Accordingly, a specific earnings management model is used which does not provide evidence of improved financial statement quality for IAS/IFRS adopters. A fee increase is observed both in the IAS/IFRS transition year and in the following year, suggesting that the effect of the switch to the new standards on fees is not only attributable to the adjustment process to different rules. We also find evidence that the fee increase is associated with the amount of financial derivatives held for hedging purposes; this can be explained by the greater auditor effort due to the application of the hedge accounting rules prescribed by IAS 39.
A related research question could involve the nature of the longer-term trend of fees after IAS/IFRS adoption. Future research can tackle this issue, but it must be considered that the years after 2006 coincide with a period of extraordinary market downturn and of severe financial stress for the banking industry.
Italy is a typical example of a stakeholder-oriented accounting system, and a further insightful extension of this analysis could investigate the effect of IAS/IFRS adoption in shareholder-oriented systems. As argued by previous literature (Bartov et al., 2005 and Hung and Subramanyam, 2007) IAS/IFRS are inspired by a shareholder-oriented model; thus, the cost of accounting harmonisation in such an environment is likely to be lower. 
NOTES
i Auditing research recognises that audit firm industry expertise may be an important determinant of audit fees, and the results on the nature of this relationship are contradictory (Ferguson et al., 2006) . Previous research on audit fee determination documents a significant industry effect for the financial industry, and banks are largely excluded (exceptions being the US cross-sectional study of Fields et al., 2004 and more recent Kangaretnam et al., 2010a) from the majority of the samples considered (e.g., Francis and Stokes, 1986; Copley and Douthett, 2002; Carson and Fargher, 2007) . Other works (e.g., Anderson and Zeghal, 1994) circumvent the industry effect problem by introducing a dummy variable for firms with specialised audit needs. Overall, empirical evidence has mostly been collected for manufacturing and non-financial auditees in a large number of countries (Hay et al., 2006) . ii A detailed analysis concerning 49 countries about the difference between IAS and local GAAP in 2001 on 21 accounting items, shows that Italy has 12 differences (Bae et al., 2008) . None of the considered countries had 21 differences. The country has the most differences from IAS is Luxembourg with 18 differences. The Italian "score" is similar to Austria (12), Belgium (13), France (12), Germany (11). Concerning US 4 difference from IAS was reported, 1 for UK and 4 for Australia.
iii Based on Wingate (1997) the litigation risk score represents the risk of doing business as an auditor in a particular country. It may take on values from 1 to 15. Among stakeholder-oriented accounting countries, it is equal to 4.82 for Belgium and Spain and to 6.22 for France and Italy. In order to give the reader an idea of the ranking of the Italian system among the other European countries, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway) have a mean value of 5.22, the Germanic group (Austria and Germany) of 4.91, and Ireland of 6.22. Only UK presents a higher value (10), that is equal to the Australian one. The highest value (15) Kim et al. (2012) . They show that audit fees increase with audit complexity and decrease with financial reporting quality. They argue that IAS/IFRS lead to increased complexity as IAS/IFRS are "comprehensive, fair-value oriented, and principle-based"; on the other hand, if IAS/IFRS improve the quality of financial reporting quality, this should reduce fees. vii When Arthur Andersen ceased to operate in the Italian Market, the AA employees and partners were taken over by Deloitte. In our sample, all the auditees that had Arthur Andersen as their audit firm switched to Deloitte & Touche. viii We also replicated the analysis without adjusting fees and assets for inflation and by including year-fixed effects.
The results are qualitatively unchanged; specifically, the estimated coefficient of the IAS dummy corresponds to a mean increase of 18.89%. ix Collegio Sindacale is made up of individual auditors enrolled in the Register of Revisori Contabili (which is a register where all Italian chartered auditors, who possesses the characteristics required by the Italian law which enforced the Eighth EU Directive on the approval of people responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, are enrolled).
x Specifically, we asked for: audit firm name and the amount of the audit fees required by the audit firm. We specified that the amount of the audit fees should exclude what auditors charged for preparing the reconciliation prospects for the IAS/IFRS transition and the reimbursement expenses. xi To check the stability over time of the results, we estimated the fee model with different time sub-samples: 2000-2006, 2001-2006, 2002-2006; 2003-2006; 2004-2006 xv We also present the results using, as the dependent variable, the positive values of the abnormal loan loss provision (column 2) and all values of the abnormal loan loss provision (column 3). In both cases the coefficient of the dummy for IAS/IFRS is not significant. xvi IAS/IFRS also changed the definition of derivatives. Italian GAAP considered a definition of derivatives based on the legal form of existing instruments in the market. IAS 39, instead, introduces a definition of derivatives based on the qualifying elements of the instruments (substance principle); this allows one to include in the derivative category all the instruments developed by financial innovation. For example, credit derivatives are encompassed by the IAS/IFRS classification of financial derivatives, whereas they are overlooked by the definition of financial derivatives provided by Italian GAAP. xvii Three forms of hedging are disciplined: fair value hedging, for the hedge to exposure of changes in fair value; cash flow hedging, for exposure to variability in cash flows; and hedging of investments in foreign operations (IAS 39, . These forms of hedging were not explicitly disciplined by Italian GAAP. xviii IAS 39, paragraph 88 specifies five conditions to be met for qualifying a hedging relationship for hedge accounting. These conditions concern the documentation of the hedging relationship, the effectiveness of the hedge, the likelihood of the related future transaction, the possibility to measure the effectiveness of the hedge, and the periodical assessment of the effectiveness of the hedge. xix Specifically, the current regulation of Italian banking activities is based on a 1993 law (TU bancario,D.Lg. 1 settembre 1993, n.385). In the late Nineties and the beginning of new century, a series of reforms changed the corporate governance system for the Italian central bank (Banca d'Italia) but did not change the structure of the 1993 law (TU bancario). The economic crisis determined the issuance at national (Italian) and European level of new rules about the supervision of the banking activity (Costi, 2012) only starting from 2008. These new rules came into effect outside of our sample (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) . xx For brevity, by Italian GAAP we refer to both Italian law and national accounting principles. xxi We compute three disparity indexes: DI EBIT =(BI IAS -BI ITGAAP )/EQ ITGAAP ; DI NI =[(NI IAS -NI ITGAAP )-(BI IAS -BI ITGAAP )]/EQ ITGAAP ; DI EQ =(EQ IAS -EQ ITGAAP )/EQ ITGAAP. BI, banking operating income, is computed in two ways: the first measure, BI1, concentrates on the operating income without considering components of profit or loss deriving from evaluation procedures; the second measure, BI2, also considers items deriving from evaluation procedures. NI is net income; EQ is equity capital. We use the absolute value of each index and rank banks into deciles; by assigning a value of nine to the largest decile and zero to the smallest, we compute the corresponding ranked indexes: RDI BI , RDI NI and RDI EQ . To obtain an overall measure of disparity ranging from zero to one, we sum the ranked indexes and divide them by the maximum cumulative value: ODI=(RDI EBIT +RDI NI +RDI EQ )/27; we compute ODI by considering BI defined as BI1 (ODI1) or BI2 (ODI2). xxii The Bank of Italy grants authorisation to engage in banking if the legal form adopted is that of a "società per azioni" (similar to UK Limited Liability partnership LLC or US limited liability company LLC) or a "società cooperativa per azioni a responsabilità limitata" (legal form general adopted by cooperative & mutual banks). 
